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 1 INTRODUCTION 
For many years, the European patent system has been recognised as highly fragmented, being the sum of 
numerous national patent systems. Only the grant process of European Patents (EP) is centralised at the 
European Patent Office (EPO). Once an EP is granted, it is subject to the national rules and practices of each 
member state where firms seek patent protection. This fragmentation reduces the effectiveness of the European 
patent system, especially because of its prohibitive costs (multiple validation, translation and renewal fees), 
substantial legal uncertainty and the economic incongruities it generates (see van Pottelsberghe, 2009; Mejer 
and van Pottelsberghe, 2012).  
The implementation of the Unitary Patent (UP) – a single patent automatically covering the territory of 25 EU 
member states, for both the application procedure and the legal enforcement after grant –  would not only 
reduce the cost of patenting in Europe, it would also make the system more attractive. Recent policy 
developments could actually be considered as important leaps towards an improved patent system in Europe1.   
Two important dimensions are subject to intense political debate2: the level of renewal fees and the operational 
design of the Unified Patent Court (UPC). The first dimension, setting up renewal fees, is more complex than 
could appear at first sight. Renewal fees are an important factor in the decision to renew a patent from the 
applicant’s viewpoint (for which low renewal fees are expected) and they have a direct effect on patent offices’ 
budgetary prospects. Indeed, since the creation of the European patent system, any EP patent renewed in a 
country leads to the payment of renewal fees paid to the national patent office, which in turn retrocedes half the 
revenue to the EPO.  
The lead question therefore is to assess whether the new UP system would lead to similar ‘revenues’ at the 
aggregate level (the EPO would collect the UP renewal fees). The mechanical subsequent question relates to the 
distribution key of half the UP fees to national patent offices (the other half remaining in the EPO budget). This 
question is legitimate and worrying for patent offices: will they benefit from higher or smaller revenue streams 
than in the past? This question has already been addressed by Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) in case 
of a total switch from the EP system to the UP system – the authors found that the total income should be higher 
with the UP than with the EP. However, as the two systems will coexist, simulations must take stock of the 
substitution effect between the two systems: if the most valuable EP (which have a higher chance to be 
protected in a large number of countries) switch towards the UP system, then one could expect smaller revenue 
streams. This substitution between the two systems will logically depend on the level of renewal fees (Europe 
Economics, 2014).  
The applied research question addressed in this paper is to assess whether and to what extent the coexistence 
of the EP and UP systems will affect the renewal fee incomes for the EPO and for national patent offices. While 
Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) provided an overview of the costs and benefits of the unitary patent for 
the different stakeholders of the patent system (eg in terms of patenting costs and intermediary costs for 
applicants), this paper focuses essentially on the budgetary consequences for patent offices. In particular, it 
approximates the conditions under which patent offices would be better off with the forthcoming dual system. 
                                                     
1 In December 2012, the EU Council adopted two regulations with a view to implementing enhanced cooperation (involving 
25 EU member states) for the creation of unitary patent protection and its translation arrangements. These regulations 
delegate to the EPO the task of granting European patents with unitary effect. In February 2013, the international 
agreement for establishing a Unified Patent Court (UPC) was signed to contribute to a greater access to patent protection 
and a better patent enforcement at European level. Straathof et al. (2012) suggest that the unitary patent project offers 
great opportunities for improvements in patent laws by the adoption of best practises. Nevertheless, there are still 
concerns about the unitary patent package (see for example, Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping, and Ullrich, 2012). In particular, the 
UP will add an additional layer in the European patent landscape rather than simplify the current system. 
2 This policy debate has been recently pointed out by the President of the EPO (see Battistelli, 2013) and by the EPO 
Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (see ESAB, 2013). 
2
 The simulation results are twofold. On the one hand, the higher the UP fees and the stronger the substitution 
between the EP and the UP, the faster the break-even of the system is reached. On the other hand, with very 
high fees, applicants would have no incentives to use the UP route and would prefer to continue to enforce their 
EP at the national level. Such limited use of the UP route would not lead to a structural improvement of the whole 
European patent system, hence on its potential effect on innovation in Europe. With low renewal fees the 
German Patent Office might actually lose a significant amount of renewal fees, which exceed by far the income 
of other national patent offices under the current system. Alternative mechanisms are presented to mitigate 
these financial risks: (1) increasing national renewal fees and, (2) increasing the UP income through greater 
attractiveness of the new system. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 compares the renewal fee income generated by an average 
European patent (EP) with that generated by an average Unitary patent (UP). The substitution between EP and 
UP is investigated in Section 3. At the core of Section 4, a break-even analysis allows identification of the 
conditions such that patent offices would not be worse off with the coexistence of the UP and EP patent 
systems. The consequences for national patent offices are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and puts 
forward policy implications. 
 
2 AVERAGE EUROPEAN PATENT VS. AVERAGE UNITARY PATENT  
Before investigating the coexistence of European Patents (EP) and Unitary Patents (UP), it is necessary to better 
understand the differences between these two types of patents. For this purpose, this section compares the 
total renewal fee income that would be generated by each type of patent. From a methodological point of view, 
this comparison is made at the patent level such that the results are independent of the relative switching 
between EP and UP, and of the number of granted patents at the EPO. 
2.1 TOTAL RENEWAL FEE INCOME AND MAINTENANCE RATE MODEL 
As described in Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a), the total renewal fee income generated by an average 
European patent (EP) in 25 EU National Patent Offices (NPOs) depends on three main factors (see equation (1)): 
 The validation rate (ߨ௜): the probability that the patent is validated in country i; 
 The maintenance rate (1 − ߜ௜௧): the probability that it is maintained each year t for a maximum of 20 
years3 (given the depreciation rate ߜ௜௧) ; 
 The level of renewal fees (ܨ௜௧) in each country and over time. 
ܸܧܲ =෍෍ߨ௜(1 − ߜ௜௧)ܨ௜௧
ଶ଴
௧ୀ଺
ଶହ
௜ୀଵ
																																																																																																																				(1) 
This total renewal fee income is shared between EPO and NPO. Indeed, half of the renewal fee income generated 
by EP at each NPO is transferred to the EPO and the other half is for the NPO itself.  
Concerning the unitary patent (UP), a similar formula (see equation (2)) can be used with the exception that the 
validation rate of the UP is by definition equal to 100 percent. As the UP renewal fees would be collected by the 
EPO, half of the amount generated would be transferred back to the NPOs. 
                                                     
3 We assumed that any European patent starts to generate renewal fees income for national patent offices from its 6th year. 
This assumption corresponds to the average grant duration at the EPO (Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007; van 
Zeebroeck, 2011). 
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 ܸܷܲ =෍(1 − ߜ௧௎௉)ܨ௧௎௉
ଶ଴
௧ୀ଺
																																																																																																																												(2) 
The major determinants of the total income generated by UP after grant are its maintenance rates over time and 
the level of renewal fees. Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) showed that the former parameter partly 
depends on the latter one, as confirmed by an econometric model evaluating the impact of renewal fees on the 
aggregate maintenance rate of patents across countries (see equation (3)). 
(1 − ߜ௜௧) = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܩܦ ௜ܲ + ߚଶܱܰܲܣܩܧ௜ + ߚଷܫܲܫ௜ +	ߚସܲܣܶܣܩܧ௧ + ߚହܨ௜௧ +	ߝ௜௧																									(3) 
The dependent variable is the average maintenance rate of granted patents validated in country i at year t.4 In 
addition to the renewal fees5 (F), this model takes into account the age of the patent and three country-level 
explanatory variables: the gross domestic product (GDP), an indicator of the strength of the national patent 
system (IPI, most recent series provided by Park, 2008, of an index that was introduced in Ginarte and Park, 
1997), and the age of membership of the country in the European Patent Convention (NPOAGE). We performed 
this estimation with a database composed of the most up-to-date information for 30 countries presenting 
enough availability of maintenance information. Table 1 presents the econometric results.  
The updated model confirms for a larger sample of countries the results of Danguy and van Pottelsberghe 
(2011a). First, GDP has a positive and significant impact on the maintenance rates, illustrating the role of market 
attractiveness for patent enforcement strategies (see Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, and van Pottelsberghe, 2009, for 
similar results in terms of the validation behaviour). Second, the level of renewal fees (FEES) significantly 
impacts the maintenance rates. High fees reduce the maintenance rate (or increase the drop-out rate). Third, 
countries that have been part of the EPC for a longer period of time (NPOAGE) have higher maintenance rates, 
thanks to a learning curve: a longer experience with the European patent system increases the attractiveness of 
the country for patent protection (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2007). Fourth, PATAGE captures the 
life cycle of patented technologies. The older a patent, the lower its maintenance rate is. Finally, the strength of 
national patent system – in terms of subject matter, enforcement and reliability (measured by IPI) – has a 
positive and significant impact. The stronger the enforcement of patent rights, the longer patents are maintained 
at the national patent office. 
  
                                                     
4 See Appendix B of Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) for more details on the computation of average maintenance 
rates at the country level. For the current paper, this computation has been repeated with the most up-to-date data. 
5 Note that for some countries, a validation fee has to be paid in addition to the renewal fees. This validation fee has been 
taken into consideration at year 6 of the patent age. See Appendix Table A.1 for the renewal fees currently in place in the 25 
EU countries. 
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 Table 1: Results of the maintenance rate econometric model 
Dependent variable: MAINTENANCE RATES 
Danguy and van 
Pottelsberghe (2011a) 
Updated data explanation 
Variables 
GDP 0.0637*** 0.0654*** country size 
(0.007) (0.00434) 
FEES -0.11912*** -0.150*** fee elasticity 
(0.026) (0.0239) 
NPOAGE 0.00791*** 0.00541*** learning curve 
(0.001) (0.000580) 
PATAGE -0.02944*** -0.0128*** technology cycle 
(0.002) (0.00161) 
IPI 0.17181*** 0.0322* enforcement 
(0.044) (0.0200) 
Constant -0.25616 0.165** 
(0.207) (0.0839) 
Observations 243 438   
Number of countries 17 30 
Adjusted R-squared 0.756 0.670   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the maintenance rate (own calculation based on EPO statistics and trilateral statistical report); GDP is 
expressed in ‘000 billion $ (World development indicators 2012); FEES stands for the national annual renewal fees and are 
expressed in ‘000 € (EPO statistics, see Appendix Table A. 1); NPOAGE is the age of membership in the EPC; IPI corresponds 
to the value of the Intellectual Property Index in 2005 (Park, 2008). 
 
2.2 RENEWAL FEES SCHEDULES AND SIMULATED MAINTENANCE RATES FOR UP 
Beyond the impact of renewal fees on the maintenance rates, the level and the structure of renewal fees 
remains at the core of the policy discussion about the unitary patent system6. Two structures of renewal fees for 
UP can be considered: (1) summing up the fees of X countries, for instance those in which most of the patents 
are validated in the current European patent system; (2) adding a constant increment of X€ each additional year 
in the patent age. Figure 1 illustrates four alternatives for the former structure – the sum of fees of the first 2 (4, 
8, or 12) countries – and four alternatives for the latter one – starting fee of €600 on year 6 and then an 
increment of €100 (€200, €400 or €1000) each additional year. 
                                                     
6 See Europe Economics (2010), Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011b), and de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe 
(2013) for a discussion on the optimal patent fee structure. 
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 Figure 1: Renewal fees schedules for UP 
 
Note: Dashed lines show fees structures which sum the fees of X countries. Plain lines show the fees structures with fixed 
annual increment. 
 
In Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a), we already argued that the proposed UP(200) is the most 
appropriate fees schedule since it has the advantage of being simpler than the additive fees structures and it 
corresponds to what the business sector is currently paying. Indeed, van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck 
(2008) showed that the average geographical scope of protection is about four countries – UP(4) is similar to 
UP(200) – for a 15-year old patent. With UP(200), the applicant would pay total renewal fees of about €30,000 
to keep its patent enforced for 20 years in the 25 EU member states. This absolute renewal patent cost is 
relatively affordable in comparison with current patenting costs in Europe7 and given the large geographical 
scope of protection provided by UP. 
Based on the new econometric results presented in Table 1 and the alternative fees schedules displayed in 
Figure 1, we simulated the maintenance rates of the UP given by equation (3). Figure 2 illustrates the results of 
these simulations. Maintenance rates for UP vary according to the chosen renewal fees structure. The higher the 
fees, the lower the maintenance rates. Note also that the lower bound of maintenance rates is assumed to be 10 
percent for all fees schedules. The higher the fees, the faster the simulated maintenance rates converges 
towards this lower bound. 
                                                     
7 For more discussion on the absolute and relative patenting costs, see van Pottelsberghe and François (2009), van 
Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2010), and Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a). 
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 Figure 2 - Simulated maintenance rates for UP 
 
Note: the simulated maintenance rates for UP were normalised to 100 percent at year 6 and the lower bound is assumed to 
be equal to 10 percent. 
 
2.3 SIMULATED UP RENEWAL FEES INCOME 
The estimated parameters of Table 1 are used to simulate the total renewal fee income generated by an average 
UP (according to equation (2)). Figure 3 presents this total income for different fee structures and compares the 
incomes generated by UP (see VUP bars) with the one generated by a current average EP (VEP according to 
equation (1)).   
Figure 3 confirms that the UP would generate at least the same total renewal fee income as the current EP and 
most likely significantly more, thanks to higher maintenance rates and higher renewal fees. Renewal fees have 
a positive impact on the total income generated by granted patents. The patent offices could thus have a 
preference for higher fees since it would increase the level of their total income. Note that these total fee 
incomes do not include the part related to the EPC member states which are not part of the unitary patent 
system (Spain, Italy, and Croatia, and non-EU member states such as Switzerland and Turkey) because this part 
of renewal fee income is not supposed to change with the new unitary patent. For the sake of clarity, the 
remainder of this analysis will rely on incremental fees schedules only. 
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 Figure 3: Simulated total renewal fee income for an average EP and an average UP 
 
Note: for VEP, own calculation based on equation (1) with the observed data for the 25 EU member states. For VUP, own 
calculation based on equation (2) with the simulated maintenance rates and different fees schedules (the parentheses (1) 
to (14) show the impact with UP renewal fees computed as the sum of (1) to (14) EP renewal fees in the current system; 
the parentheses (100) to (2000) show the total income of an average UP with steady yearly increases of renewal fees). 
These simulations are actually valid in the frame of a total switch from the current EP system towards the UP 
system. The reality is that the two systems will coexist and hence the degree of substitution between the two 
must be taken into account. 
 
3 THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT 
Although an average UP would generate more income than an average EP, the total renewal fees collected by 
patent offices within the unitary patent system (including UP and EP) might even be lower than the income with 
the current EP system. If both types of patent coexist, applicants will have the opportunity to choose either to 
validate the granted European patent in individual countries (ie the current EP situation) or to validate the patent 
with unitary effect across the 25 EU countries (the UP system). This choice would be made for each patent 
according to the expected market for the protected technology and the desired geographical scope of 
protection. The fear of patent offices is that only the patents that are currently validated in a large number of 
countries (and hence generate significant renewal fees income) would opt for the unitary patent. In other words, 
national patent offices could be worse off with the UP if the most valuable current EP switch to UP (with lower 
absolute fees than the current cumulative fees paid for a large geographical scope of protection in the EU).  
This paper precisely aims to better understand the budgetary consequences of this substitution effect between 
EP and UP on the total renewal fees income collected by patent offices. In particular, this section extends the 
comparison between one average UP and one average EP (introduced in Danguy and van Pottelsberghe, 2011a, 
and presented in Section 2) by taking into consideration the relative distribution between the two types of 
patents. 
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 3.1 RENEWAL FEES INCOME UNDER THE DUAL SYSTEM 
Given the coexistence of UP and EP, the total renewal fee income collected by patent offices after the grant of 
European patents would depend on three key factors: 
 the renewal fee income generated by the EP,	ܸܧ෣ܲ  (which depends on their validation and 
maintenance rates); 
 the renewal fee income generated by the UP,	ܸܷ෣ܲ  (and hence their maintenance rates and the level of 
UP fees); 
 the share of EP (ܵܪா௉) and the share of UP (ܵܪ௎௉) in the total number of granted patents by the EPO. 
The total income for patent offices would also depend on the total number of granted patents. For the sake of 
simplicity, it is assumed that the number of granted patents is stable. More precisely, the focus is on the total 
renewal fee income generated by one average granted patent at the EPO given by the weighted sum defined in 
equation (4). This methodological choice is a conservative assumption since it does not take into account the 
potential increase in patent applications due to an improved attractiveness of the European patent system, 
thanks to the unitary patent. 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݂݁݁ݏ	݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ = ܸܧ෣ܲ ∗ ܧܷܲܲ + ܧܲ + ܸܷ෣ܲ ∗
ܷܲ
ܷܲ + ܧܲ = ܸܧ෣ܲ ∗ ܵܪா௉ + ܸܷ෣ܲ ∗ ܵܪ௎௉											(4) 
3.2 WORKING HYPOTHESES  
In addition to performing simulations at the patent level, three working hypotheses are at the core of the 
analysis, ensuring cautious lower bounds estimates:  
 The upper bound of the maintenance rates for ܸܧ෣ܲ  corresponds to the case of an average EP (ܸܧܲ) 
estimated in Section 2; 
 The lower bound of maintenance rate for ܸܷ෣ܲ  corresponds to the case of an average UP (ܸܷܲ) 
estimated in Section 2; 
 The lower the share of UP (ܵܪ௎௉), the higher the maintenance rates for those UP. 
In other words, it is assumed that the first patents which will opt for the UP route would be those that would have 
been validated in a larger number of countries (with respect to their sectorial benchmark) and maintained for a 
longer duration in the current EP system. This kind of patents would most largely benefit from the unitary patent 
system. On the one hand, it means that the first UP would generate on average a higher renewal fees income 
(ܸܷ෣ܲ  due to a higher maintenance) than the average UP patent in case of a total switch (ܸܷܲ simulated in 
Section 2). On the other hand, it means that the remaining EP would generate on average a lower renewal fees 
income (ܸܧ෣ܲ  would be smaller due to smaller validation and maintenance rates) than the current situation with 
only EP (ܸܧܲ computed in Section 2).  
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of simulated maintenance rates related to UP, according to the last three 
working hypotheses. The lowest curve represents the maintenance rate of an average UP if all patents opt for 
the UP system. It is obtained through the simulations performed in Section 2. The upper lines correspond to 
different scenarios in terms of the share of UP (ܵܪ௎௉  varying between 10 percent and 90 percent) in total EPO 
granted patents. 
9
 Figure 4 - UP maintenance rates according to its market share 
 
Note: This figure is based on UP(400) renewal fees. The lowest line (100 percent UP) corresponds to the simulated 
maintenance rate presented in Figure 2. The other lines are equally shared between this simulated line and the upper 
bound. This upper bound is assumed to correspond to a maintenance rate of 40 percent after 20 years for the lowest share 
of UP. For the lowest fees schedules UP(100) and UP(200), this assumption is set up at 80 percent and 60 percent, 
respectively. 
 
4 BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS 
This section aims to identify the break-even conditions for patent offices, ie the conditions such that the total 
renewal fees income collected by patent offices with the UP would be at least equal to the one generated by the 
current situation (100 percent EP). Since the total renewal fee income depends on several factors, our break-
even analysis is presented in four subsections that focus on one particular dimension of the total income. 
4.1 EP BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS 
The assumptions made in terms of UP maintenance rates (see Figure 4) allow us to compute the renewal fees 
income generated per patent by the first UP,	ܸܷ෣ܲ , according to equation (2). The upper rows of Table 2 present 
these simulation results for the different UP fees schedule (see Figure 1). First, the row related to a 100 percent 
share of UP (in case of a total switch) corresponds to the simulated total income per average patent presented 
in Section 2.3. Second, for a given fees schedule, we observe that the lower the share of UP, the higher the 
unitary patent income (ܸܷ෣ܲ). This is due to the fact that the first patents that will opt for UP would be those with 
higher maintenance rates (see discussion in Section 3.2) on average. Third, the results presented in Table 2 
confirm that the unitary patent income tends to increase with the level of UP fees.  
Based on the unitary patent income, one can measure the required EP income per patent that would ensure the 
break-even of patent offices with the UP system (see the lower part of Table 2): 
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 ܤܧ	ா௉ =
ܸܧܲ − ܵܪ௎௉ ∗ ܸܷ෣ܲ
ܵܪா௉ 																																																																																																	(5) 
Considering the UP(200) fees schedule and assuming that 20 percent of granted patents at the EPO would opt 
for the UP, the results presented in Table 2 can be interpreted as follow (cf. the shaded cells): 
 an average UP would generate about €22,000; 
 an average remaining EP should generate at least €7,525 (in comparison with €10,416 generated by a 
current average EP) to ensure that patent offices will not be worse off. 
The interpretations of the break-even conditions in terms of EP are twofold. First, the higher the UP fees, the 
faster the break-even of the system is reached. Second, the greater the share of UP, the faster the system 
breaks even, because an average UP generates more revenue than an average EP in case of a total switch. To 
balance their budgets, national patent offices could have the tendency to put in place very high fees for the UP. 
However, very UP high fees would be synonymous with a low attractiveness of the system and hence the share 
of UP would tend to be low. The policy arbitrage is to find a balance between (1) high UP fees to have a high 
income per average UP and (2) low UP fees to have a large number of patents opting for the UP route. 
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 Table 2: ࢂࢁࡼ෣  and break-even EP 
European Patent   Unitary Patent income: ࢂࢁࡼ෣  (€) 
ࢂࡱࡼ ࡿࡴࡱࡼ ࡿࡴࢁࡼ UP(100) UP(200) UP(300) UP(400) UP(500) UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000) 
10416 100% 0% 
90% 10% 17150 22400 24750 29640 32760 50360 69750 89920
80% 20% 16903 21979 24140 28453 31163 46824 64375 82749
70% 30% 16656 21559 23530 27267 29567 43289 59000 75578
60% 40% 16409 21138 22920 26080 27970 39753 53625 68407
50% 50% 16162 20718 22309 24893 26373 36218 48250 61236
40% 60% 15915 20297 21699 23707 24777 32682 42875 54064
30% 70% 15668 19877 21089 22520 23180 29147 37500 46893
20% 80% 15421 19456 20479 21333 21583 25611 32125 39722
10% 90% 15174 19036 19869 20147 19987 22076 26750 32551
  0% 100% 14927 18615 19259 17865 17041 17721 21060 25229 
  Break-even EP: ࡮ࡱ ࡱࡼ (€) 
  ࡿࡴࡱࡼ ࡿࡴࢁࡼ UP(100) UP(200) UP(300) UP(400) UP(500) UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000) 
100% 0% 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416
90% 10% 9667 9084 8823 8280 7933 5977 3823 1582
80% 20% 8794 7525 6985 5906 5229 1314 0 0
70% 30% 7741 5640 4795 3194 2208 0
60% 40% 6420 3267 2080 0 0
50% 50% 4670 114 0
40% 60% 2167 0
30% 70% 0
20% 80% 
10% 90% 
  0% 100%                 
Note: The blank cells concerning the break-even EP correspond to cases for which patent offices will be better off than the current situation regardless of the renewal fees income generated by 
remaining EP.
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 4.2 WHAT WOULD EP GENERATE? 
The previous subsection showed that the level of EP break-even decreases with the share of UP (the higher the 
share of UP the lower the risk of losing renewal fees income). However, the extent to which the real EP fee 
income would be decreasing according to the share of UP is not taken into account. The distribution of EP 
renewal fee income according to the age of patents provides interesting insights on this matter. Since the level 
of annual renewal fees tends to increase with the age of patents, the distribution of income over time is not 
uniform. In other words, patents that are maintained for a longer period tend to generate a relatively higher share 
of the total income collected by patent offices. Once the UP is be created, we can expect that those valuable 
patents would have a high probability to opt for UP. This switch from EP to UP would most probably lead to a 
larger relative loss of EP renewal fees than the relative share represented by those valuable patents in the total 
granted patents.  
In order to estimate the reduction in EP income, we computed the cumulative renewal fee income according to 
the maintained patents in three main EU member states (Germany, France and United Kingdom). Figure 5 
shows this distribution of current EP renewal fees income. For instance, we observe that the first 15 percent of 
patents that are maintained for the longest duration represent more than 30 percent of total renewal fee income 
collected in Germany. This curve for Germany is used as a conservative assumption to estimate ܸܧ෣ܲ  according 
to the share of UP. It is assumed that the first patents that will opt for UP will be those maintained for a longer 
average duration in the current system. This methodology allows us to better approximate the extent to which 
the average renewal fee income generated by remaining EP evolves according to the share of UP (see the first 
column of Table 3).  
Figure 5: Distribution of current EP renewal fees income 
 
Note: The cumulative income is the sum of annual renewal fees income generated by patents. Each annual renewal fees 
income is to the product of the maintenance rate of patent and the official annual fee corresponding to each age of the 
patents. 
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 4.3 UP BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS 
Based on the EP income within the new system (ܸܧ෣ܲ), we evaluate the UP income per patent that ensures the 
break-even of patent offices (see the last column of Table 3): 
ܤܧ	௎௉ =
ܸܧܲ − ܵܪா௉ ∗ ܸܧ෣ܲ
ܵܪ௎௉ 																																																																																																											(6) 
Table 3: ࢂࡱࡼ෣  and break-even UP 
European patent Unitary patent  
ࢂࡱࡼ෣  ࡿࡴࡱࡼ ࡿࡴࢁࡼ ࡮ࡱ ࢁࡼ 
 €   10 416  100% 0% 
 €     8 124  90% 10%  €   31 039  
 €     5 833  80% 20%  €   28 747  
 €     3 854  70% 30%  €   25 727  
 €     2 500  60% 40%  €   22 290  
 €     1 458  50% 50%  €   19 373  
 €        833  40% 60%  €   16 804  
 €        417  30% 70%  €   14 701  
 €        208  20% 80%  €   12 968  
 €        104  10% 90%  €   11 561  
  0% 100%  €   10 416  
Note: The ܸܧ෣ܲ  are computed by considering the distribution of EP renewal fees income in Germany according to the 
percentiles of maintained patents (see Figure 5). 
Assuming that 20 percent of granted patents at the EPO would opt for the UP, the results presented in Table 3 
should be read as follows (the shaded cells): 
 an average remaining EP would generate about €6000 (ie less than 60 percent of the current average 
EP income,	ܸܧܲ) ; 
 an average UP should generate at least €28,747 to ensure that patent offices will not be worse off with 
the new system (Table 2 shows that this amount would be achieved with fees of UP(400). 
Assuming that 80 percent of granted patents at the EPO would opt for the UP, the results presented in Table 3 
would then be read as follows (cf. the shaded cells): 
 an average remaining EP would generate about €200; 
 an average UP should generate at least €13,000 to ensure that patent offices will not be worse off with 
the new system (Table 2 shows that this amount would already be achieved with fees of UP(100). 
4.4 SIMULATED TOTAL RENEWAL FEES INCOME 
Given the estimations of the UP income (ܸܷ෣ܲ  in Table 2) and the EP income (ܸܧ෣ܲ  in Table 3), simulations 
based on equation (4) measure the total renewal fees income generated by an average patent granted at the 
EPO. Table 4 and Figure 6 show the sensitivity of these simulations to different UP fees schedules. The first row 
(share of EP equal to 100 percent and share of UP equal to 0 percent) corresponds to the current situation. The 
interpretations of these simulation results are twofold. First, the higher the level of UP fees, the higher the total 
renewal fee income per average patent granted at the EPO, independently from the share of UP. In other words 
there is a natural temptation to set high renewal fees. Second, with low UP renewal fees there is a U-shaped 
relationship between the share of UP and the total renewal fee income per average patent. This is due to the 
substitution effect between the two types of patent. With higher renewal fees (from UP(400) onwards), the 
higher the share of UP the higher the total renewal fee income. The total renewal fee income collected by patent 
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 offices could actually be lower than the income in the current situation if the unitary patent system is not 
attractive enough (ie low share of UP) and has low renewal fees. 
At first glance these simulation results strengthen the argument for high UP renewal fees, so that they generate 
more income than under the current situation. However, very high fees would lead to a low use of the new 
unitary patent. Such situation would most probably not meet the expectations of EU member states which have 
asked for a structural improvement in the European patent system8.  
Table 4: Simulated total renewal fees income per average patent (€) 
ࡿࡴࡱࡼ ࡿࡴࢁࡼ UP(100) UP(200) UP(300) UP(400) UP(500) UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000) 
100% 0% 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416 10416
90% 10% 9027 9552 9787 10276 10588 12348 14287 16304
80% 20% 8047 9062 9494 10357 10899 14031 17541 21216
70% 30% 7694 9165 9757 10878 11568 15684 20398 25371
60% 40% 8063 9955 10668 11932 12688 17401 22950 28863
50% 50% 8810 11088 11884 13176 13916 18838 24854 31347
40% 60% 9882 12512 13353 14557 15199 19943 26058 32772
30% 70% 11093 14039 14887 15889 16351 20528 26375 32950
20% 80% 12378 15607 16425 17108 17308 20531 25742 31819
10% 90% 13667 17143 17892 18142 17998 19878 24085 29306
0% 100% 14927 18615 19259 17865 17041 17721 21060 25229
Note: the cells which are in bold and italic correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation (ܸܧܲ, €10416). 
Figure 6: Simulated total renewal fees income per average patent 
 
Note: The bars related to a share UP equal to 0 percent correspond to the current situation (ܸܧܲ). See Table 4 for more fees 
schedules.  
                                                     
8 See, for instance, the press release of the Council of the European Union about the creation of unitary patent protection 
(17 December 2012). 
€ 0
€ 2,000
€ 4,000
€ 6,000
€ 8,000
€ 10,000
€ 12,000
€ 14,000
€ 16,000
€ 18,000
€ 20,000
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
To
ta
l r
en
ew
al
 fe
es
 in
co
m
e
SHARE UP
UP(100) UP(200) UP(400)
Current 
situation 
15
 5 THE FATE OF NATIONAL PATENT OFFICES 
While previous sections analyse the total income generated by an average patent, this section focuses on the 
budgetary consequences for each national patent office (NPO) and for the EPO. Although the total income within 
the unitary patent system could be higher than the current situation, the impact for NPOs could be negative, 
depending on how the total income is shared amongst them. This question is actually a key aspect of the 
negotiations related to the forthcoming Unitary Patent renewal fees. 
5.1 TOTAL RENEWAL FEE INCOME FOR EACH NPO 
Since EP and UP will coexist within the European patent system, the sources of income for each NPO and for the 
EPO will be twofold. First, regarding European patents, the current situation will continue to prevail. Each NPO 
keeps half of the renewal fees paid for maintaining EP enforced in their jurisdiction, the other half being 
retroceded to the EPO. Second, for the maintenance of UP, there will be centralised collection of renewal fees 
performed by the EPO, which will subsequently retrocede half of these fees to NPOs. The bone of contention is 
logically related to the distribution key used by the EPO to allocate the UP renewal fee income amongst NPOs. 
Several distribution keys can be considered (according to GDP, to population, or to former share of EP renewal 
fees income)9. For the present simulation, we have opted for the GDP distribution key, as it is the most 
legitimate and easy to implement (fast growing countries will benefit more). In other words, the share of UP 
renewal fees that will be distributed by the EPO back to the NPOs is related to their GDP size. A more complex 
distribution key has been created by NPOs’ representatives: the 2008 politically negotiated distribution key 
(European Council, 2008). It is compared with the GDP distribution key in Appendix Table A.2. 
The total renewal fees income for each country i – with a distribution key ܦ௜௎௉  for the UP income – is computed 
along equation (7): 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݂݁݁ݏ	݅݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ = ቈ
∑ ߨపෝ ൫1 − ߜప௧෢൯ܨ௜௧ଶ଴௧ୀ଺
2 ቉ ∗ ܵܪா௉ + ቎ܦ௜
௎௉ ∗
∑ ቀ1 − ߜ௧௎௉෢ ቁܨ௧௎௉ଶ଴௧ୀ଺
2 ቏ ∗ ܵܪ௎௉					(7) 
Table 5: Total renewal fees income per average patent for Germany (€) 
ࡿࡴࡱࡼ ࡿࡴࢁࡼ UP(100) UP(200) UP(300) UP(400) UP(500) UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000) 
100% 0% 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760
90% 10% 2163 2231 2262 2327 2368 2599 2853 3118
80% 20% 1680 1814 1870 1984 2055 2466 2927 3410
70% 30% 1371 1564 1642 1789 1880 2421 3040 3693
60% 40% 1260 1508 1602 1768 1867 2486 3215 3992
50% 50% 1255 1554 1658 1828 1925 2572 3362 4215
40% 60% 1343 1688 1798 1957 2041 2664 3467 4349
30% 70% 1474 1861 1972 2104 2164 2713 3481 4345
20% 80% 1632 2056 2163 2253 2279 2702 3387 4185
10% 90% 1797 2253 2352 2384 2366 2612 3165 3851
0% 100% 1961 2445 2530 2347 2238 2328 2766 3314
Note: the cells which are in bold and italic correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation. 
 
                                                     
9 For a discussion on the choice of an appropriate distribution key between NPO, see Danguy and van Pottelsberghe 
(2011a). 
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 Table 5 shows the simulations for Germany (see Section 5.3 for the EPO and all NPOs). The German patent office 
would have a significant drop in its revenues because of the implementation of the UP, because Germany 
currently benefits from a leading position within the European patent system (ie being the largest country 
within the European Union, which secures higher validation rates and maintenance rate; see Danguy and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2011a). Indeed, Germany represents more than half of the current EP renewal fee income (see 
Appendix Table A.2 for the 25 member states included in the UP system). The extent to which the German patent 
office total income with the UP system is lower than their current ‘EP’ income (€2760 per average patent granted 
at the EPO) also depends on the level of UP fees and the share of UP in total EPO granted patents. Table 5 clearly 
indicates that if the German patent office wants to keep a similar stream of revenues from the European patents, 
it would opt for very high UP renewal fees, with yearly increases of €1,500. This is true with 10 percent to 90 
percent of EPO-granted patents opting for the UP. 
5.2 BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY 
While there are intense political negotiations concerning the UP fees schedule and the distribution key, an 
alternative approach is rarely coined by policy makers. Instead of focusing exclusively on UP renewal fees, 
negotiators could also consider a change in EP renewal fees (national renewal fees used for the maintenance of 
the EP and national patents). At the level of NPOs, the potential losses due to the creation of UP could actually be 
compensated for through two channels: 
(1) increasing the EP income by increasing the national renewal fees; 
(2) increasing the UP income by: 
 increasing the UP renewal fees (see the right columns in Table 5 for Germany); 
 increasing the number of patents opting for UP thanks to a better attractiveness of the 
European patent system. 
These alternatives are investigated in this section for Germany (see Section 5.3 for results concerning all NPOs).  
Table 6 presents the increase in EP fees that would allow a stable revenue stream to be maintained for the 
German patent office. Since the increase in fees concerns only EP, we observe that the lower the share of EP, the 
higher the required increase in EP fees in order to compensate similar losses in total income. For instance, with 
UP(100), the increase in EP fees corresponds to a multiplier of 1.3 if only 10 percent of the patents opt for the 
UP route, and to 121 if 80 percent of the patents opt for the UP route. In other words, Germany has a financial 
incentive to argue for very high UP renewal fees, and to reduce the use of the UP route.  
Table 6: Required EP renewal fee multiplier in order to secure break-even in Germany 
SH EP SH UP UP(100) UP(200) UP(300) UP(400) UP(500) UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000) 
100% 0%   
90% 10% 1.36 1.32 1.30 1.26 1.24 1.10
80% 20% 2.03 1.90 1.85 1.74 1.67 1.28
70% 30% 3.29 2.97 2.84 2.60 2.45 1.56
60% 40% 5.44 4.71 4.43 3.94 3.64 1.81
50% 50% 10.17 8.34 7.71 6.67 6.08 2.14
40% 60% 19.88 15.28 13.80 11.70 10.57 2.27
30% 70% 46.68 32.93 28.97 24.30 22.14 2.65
20% 80% 121.23 76.04 64.59 55.02 52.22 7.11
10% 90% 411.55 216.92 174.95 160.93 169.00 63.72
0% 100%                 
Note: The blank cells correspond to cases for which patent offices will be better off than the current situation. 
An alternative solution would be to have more patents granted by the EPO. The increase in EPO granted patents 
(compared to the case with 60,000 granted patents at the EPO) that would allow for a stable revenue stream in 
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 Germany is displayed in Table 7. For instance, with UP(100), and if the share of UP is equal to 10 percent of total 
patents granted by the EPO, one would need 1.3 times more patents granted in order to maintain Germany's 
revenue stream. 
Table 7: Required multiplier for total EPO granted patents in order to secure break-even in Germany 
SH EP SH UP UP(100) UP(200) UP(300) UP(400) UP(500) UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000) 
100% 0%   
90% 10% 1.27 1.18 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.02 
80% 20% 1.49 1.33 1.28 1.21 1.17 1.05 
70% 30% 1.63 1.42 1.36 1.27 1.23 1.06 
60% 40% 1.70 1.45 1.38 1.29 1.24 1.05 
50% 50% 1.71 1.44 1.38 1.28 1.24 1.04 
40% 60% 1.68 1.40 1.34 1.26 1.22 1.02 
30% 70% 1.62 1.34 1.28 1.22 1.20 1.01 
20% 80% 1.56 1.28 1.22 1.18 1.17 1.02 
10% 90% 1.48 1.20 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.05 
0% 100% 1.41 1.13 1.09 1.18 1.23 1.19     
Note: The blank cells correspond to cases for which patent offices will be better off than the current situation. 
5.3 BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS FOR ALL PATENT OFFICES 
Table 8 presents the simulation results for the EPO and the 25 NPOs of the unitary patent system, with the 
UP(200) renewal fees schedule and the GDP distribution key (see Appendix Table A.3 for the simulations with 
the politically agreed distribution key). The results show that only a handful of NPOs could be negatively 
impacted by the creation of the unitary patent system. Except for the German case, the budgetary losses for 
these patent offices are very low and correspond to cases with relatively low shares of UPs. 
The first part of Table 8 shows that with a renewal fee of UP(200) the EPO would have a slight reduction of its 
revenue stream if less than 50 percent of the EPO-granted patents would opt for the UP. In order to secure a 
permanent break-even, the EP renewal fees should be subject to a multiplier of maximum 1.55 (or a 55 percent 
increase). Or, if the EP renewal fees are not subject to any change, the number of patents granted should 
increase by maximum 6 percent (multiplier of 1.06). 
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 Table 8: EPO and all NPO simulations with UP(200) and a ‘GDP’ DISTRIBUTION KEY  
Total renewal fees income per average patent for patent offices with UP(200) (€) 
SH EP SH UP EPO DE FR GB NL SE BE AT PL DK IE FI CZ PT HU GR LU RO SK SI BG CY EE LT LV MT 
100% 0% 5208 2760 814 747 284 100 55 111 22 48 33 51 25 27 37 22 10 13 11 8 10 5 6 4 4 0 
90% 10% 4776 2231 787 753 264 110 78 110 54 59 44 56 32 37 36 35 11 21 16 9 11 5 6 6 5 1 
80% 20% 4531 1814 787 783 255 123 101 113 86 70 55 62 39 47 37 49 12 28 20 11 11 6 6 8 5 1 
70% 30% 4583 1564 833 854 262 141 127 122 118 84 67 71 48 59 40 64 14 36 25 13 12 7 6 9 6 2 
60% 40% 4978 1508 930 971 287 165 155 138 150 101 81 83 58 72 45 79 16 45 31 15 14 8 7 11 7 3 
50% 50% 5544 1554 1053 1110 321 192 184 157 182 118 96 96 68 85 51 94 19 54 36 18 16 9 7 14 8 3 
40% 60% 6256 1688 1197 1267 363 220 214 179 213 136 111 110 79 99 58 110 22 62 42 20 18 10 8 16 9 4 
30% 70% 7019 1861 1347 1430 408 249 243 202 243 155 126 124 89 112 65 125 25 71 48 23 20 11 9 18 10 4 
20% 80% 7803 2056 1499 1592 454 278 271 225 271 173 141 139 100 125 73 139 28 79 54 26 23 13 11 20 11 5 
10% 90% 8571 2253 1648 1750 499 306 298 247 298 190 155 152 110 138 80 153 30 87 59 28 25 14 12 22 13 5 
0% 100% 9308 2445 1789 1901 542 332 324 269 324 206 168 165 119 150 87 167 33 95 64 30 27 15 13 24 14 5 
Required EP renewal fee multiplier in order to secure break-even 
SH EP SH UP EPO DE FR GB NL SE BE AT PL DK IE FI CZ PT HU GR LU RO SK SI BG CY EE LT LV MT 
100% 0%
90% 10% 1.14 1.32 1.06 1.11 1.01 1.02 1.06
80% 20% 1.34 1.90 1.09 1.27 1.09
70% 30% 1.55 2.97 1.35
60% 40% 1.36 4.71 
50% 50% 8.34 
40% 60% 15.28 
30% 70% 32.93 
20% 80% 76.04 
10% 90% 216.92 
0% 100%                                                     
Required multiplier for total EPO granted patents in order to secure break-even 
SH EP SH UP EPO DE FR GB NL SE BE AT PL DK IE FI CZ PT HU GR LU RO SK SI BG CY EE LT LV MT 
100% 0%
90% 10% 1.04 1.18 1.01 1.03 1.002 1.01 1.01
80% 20% 1.06 1.33 1.01 1.04 1.01
70% 30% 1.06 1.42 1.04
60% 40% 1.02 1.45 
50% 50% 1.44 
40% 60% 1.40 
30% 70% 1.34 
20% 80% 1.28 
10% 90% 1.20 
0% 100%   1.13                                                 
Note: The bold and italic cells correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation. The blank cells correspond to cases which are better off than the current situation. 
19
 6 SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The main research question addressed in this paper is to assess whether the forthcoming European patent 
landscape, composed of two parallel systems (the new UP and the ‘classical’ EP), would lead to similar ‘renewal 
fee revenues’ for both the EPO and NPOs. This question has been addressed by Danguy and van Pottelsberghe 
(2011a) for the scenario of a total switch from the current EP system towards the UP system, showing that 
under such extreme circumstances most patent offices should be better off (with the exception of Germany). 
However, as the EP and the UP will coexist, simulations must take stock of the substitution effect between the 
two systems: if the most valuable EP (which are likely to be protected in a large number of countries) switch 
towards the UP system, then one could expect smaller revenue streams.  
The paper starts with a description of the various options for the UP renewal fee schedule, a particularly 
sensitive issue for the stakeholders of the system. The debate between member states is related to the number 
of cumulated renewal fees taken to define the forthcoming UP renewal fees. Some countries would opt for the 
sum of 8 (or more) national renewal fees (defined as UP(8) in this paper), while others would prefer the 
equivalent of four countries (UP(4)). An alternative and simpler scheme suggested in this paper is to start with a 
€600 renewal fee for the first year of enforcement and then add each year a fixed amount. The smallest would 
be €100 added each year (or UP(100)) and the highest would be to add each year €2,000 (defined as 
UP(2000)). Our preferred renewal fee schedule is UP(200), because it is relatively low and is close to UP(4). 
Four countries is what the industry is ready to pay, as the patents granted 15 years ago by the EPO are currently 
being enforced in 4 countries. 
The simulations presented in this paper lead to the following conclusions. First, a total switch towards the UP 
system will always generate much higher aggregate revenues for the whole patent system and for all NPOs, 
except Germany and a few other NPOs. Second, taking into account the substitution effect leads to smaller 
aggregate revenues, following a U-shaped relationship with respect to the percentage use of UP (for instance, 
with relatively low renewal fees, the aggregate fee income would be higher than with the current system only if 
more than 40 percent of the patents granted by the EPO would opt for the UP). Higher renewal fees would 
mitigate this effect, and actually secure higher aggregate revenues than in the past. Third, there are large 
discrepancies between patent offices, whereby smaller countries should gain more than in the past and larger 
countries, especially Germany, would have smaller renewal fee income. Extremely high UP renewal fees would 
mitigate this effect and secure that all countries earn more than with the current system. 
In a nutshell, the simulations help to understand the most likely positions of several stakeholders. Smaller 
countries would opt for smaller renewal fees (say, UP(100) or UP(200)); the EPO would opt for medium level 
renewal fees (ie UP(400) or UP(500)), whereas Germany would opt for very high fees (probably UP(1500) or 
more). In other words, one could imagine that the political negotiations would converge towards a situation 
slightly above the EPO preferences, more than UP(500), as it would reduce the losses for Germany and 
drastically reduce the risks for the EPO. 
But this approach would be ill-founded, because it falls short of taking into account what innovators need. After 
all, the renewal fee revenues of NPOs should be a secondary or tertiary element, not the primary one. This is 
however not the case; negotiations essentially consider the UP renewal fee structure, and whether the new 
bimodal system would generate enough resources for the sustainability of NPOs. 
An alternative approach might be more efficient, and show a real political will to transform the UP into an 
attractive patenting route for applicants. Instead of leveraging the UP renewal fees schedule, policymakers 
should rather leverage national renewal fee schedules, also used for the EP. This would allow countries to adopt 
a local policy towards patent systems. For UP patents a low renewal fee structure should be set (maximum 
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 UP(200)), and each national patent office should then leverage the EP renewal fees, increasing them to secure 
at the same time higher revenue streams and make the UP more attractive than the EP. 
The main office that might still see a significant drop in its renewal fee income is the German Patent Office, which 
has historically benefited from its ‘largest economy’ status in Europe and hence generates higher than expected 
validation and maintenance rates, or an undeserved share of renewal fee income. In order to secure its revenue 
stream, with UP(200) and a 40 percent use of the UP, Germany should multiply its EP renewal fees by 4.5, which 
is probably too high. An alternative route to mitigate the potential losses is to have more patent applications at 
the EPO, which is likely to be the case if low UP renewal fees are set. Germany might be the only country to lose 
what it was probably not supposed to earn in the first place. 
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 APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A. 1: Renewal fees at the European national patent offices (€) 
Patent 
office 
Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 Y19 Y20 
DE 130 180 240 290 350 470 620 760 910 1060 1230 1410 1590 1760 1940 
FR 72 92 130 170 210 250 290 330 380 430 490 550 620 690 760 
GB 112 137 161 186 211 236 261 310 360 435 509 571 633 695 745 
NL 185 220 280 340 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 
SE 342 194 237 269 301 334 366 409 441 474 506 538 581 614 646 
BE 85 100 125 145 150 195 220 250 290 330 370 410 455 500 545 
AT 104 208 313 417 522 626 731 835 940 1044 1148 1253 1357 1566 1775 
PL 112 99 112 137 161 186 199 224 236 261 286 311 335 360 385 
DK 329 215 242 276 309 343 376 410 444 484 524 565 605 645 686 
IE 134 150 176 194 220 242 265 285 311 335 356 382 408 438 468 
FI 545 245 290 320 360 425 485 540 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 
CZ 155 73 73 109 146 219 292 364 437 510 583 656 729 802 875 
PT 129 103 154 308 360 360 411 463 514 565 565 668 668 720 720 
HU 562 479 479 479 479 479 479 496 496 496 496 514 514 531 531 
GR 440 100 115 140 190 240 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 
LU 66 82 99 115 131 148 165 180 198 213 230 246 262 281 300 
RO 300 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 370 400 500 500 500 500 500 
SK 232 133 149 166 199 232 266 299 332 365 398 465 531 597 664 
SI 150 60 70 80 110 154 200 234 274 310 390 510 654 870 1100 
BG 173 128 154 206 257 308 360 411 462 514 565 617 668 771 874 
CY 200 120 140 160 180 200 240 280 320 360 420 480 540 600 660 
EE 160 134 153 179 205 243 281 320 358 403 447 492 537 582 626 
LT 188 165 188 212 235 294 294 294 294 294 353 353 353 353 353 
LV 189 171 213 256 320 320 320 320 320 320 427 427 427 427 427 
MT 105 82 93 105 116 128 140 151 163 175 186 198 210 221 233 
Notes: The validations fees are included in the renewal fees for year 6. 
Source: EPO statistics available on http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/natlaw/en/vi/index.htm  
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 Table A. 2: Distribution keys across the national patent offices (%) 
Patent 
office EP 
Unitary patent 
GDP policy 
proposal 
DE 52.99% 26.27% 30.94% 
FR 15.64% 19.22% 12.94% 
GB 14.33% 20.42% 11.53% 
NL 5.45% 5.82% 8.71% 
SE 1.91% 3.57% 4.12% 
BE 1.06% 3.48% 3.18% 
AT 2.13% 2.89% 6.71% 
PL 0.42% 3.48% 1.88% 
DK 0.93% 2.21% 3.06% 
IE 0.64% 1.81% 1.65% 
FI 0.98% 1.78% 1.65% 
CZ 0.48% 1.28% 0.94% 
PT 0.51% 1.61% 2.00% 
HU 0.71% 0.93% 1.06% 
GR 0.42% 1.79% 1.76% 
LU 0.19% 0.35% 0.59% 
RO 0.25% 1.02% 1.41% 
SK 0.21% 0.69% 0.82% 
SI 0.16% 0.33% 0.47% 
BG 0.20% 0.29% 0.94% 
CY 0.10% 0.16% 0.71% 
EE 0.11% 0.14% 0.82% 
LT 0.08% 0.26% 0.82% 
LV 0.08% 0.15% 0.71% 
MT 0.01% 0.06% 0.59% 
Note: The column entitled ‘EP’ corresponds to the current distribution of EP renewal fees income (computed as in equation 
(1) with most-up-to-date information about validation and maintenance of EP); the GDP distribution key is based on the 
GDP series provided in the World development indicators 2012; and the policy proposal is a rescaling (due to the absence 
of Spain and Italy in the current simulations) of the proposition made by the European Council (2008). 
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 Table A. 3: EPO and all NPO simulations with UP(200) and ‘POLICY PROPOSAL’ DISTRIBUTION KEY 
Total renewal fees income per average patent for patent offices with UP(200) (€) 
SH EP SH UP EPO DE FR GB NL SE BE AT PL DK IE FI CZ PT HU GR LU RO SK SI BG CY EE LT LV MT 
100% 0% 5208 2760 814 747 284 100 55 111 22 48 33 51 25 27 37 22 10 13 11 8 10 5 6 4 4 0 
90% 10% 4776 2284 717 653 297 116 74 153 36 68 42 54 28 41 38 35 14 25 17 11 18 11 13 12 11 7 
80% 20% 4531 1916 649 588 318 135 95 197 51 89 51 59 32 56 40 49 17 37 23 14 25 18 21 20 17 13 
70% 30% 4583 1715 629 566 355 159 117 246 67 111 62 66 37 72 44 63 22 49 30 17 33 24 28 28 24 19 
60% 40% 4978 1705 664 595 409 188 142 299 83 136 74 77 43 88 50 78 26 62 36 21 41 31 36 35 30 25 
50% 50% 5544 1796 727 649 471 220 168 355 99 162 88 89 51 105 57 93 31 74 43 25 49 37 43 43 37 30 
40% 60% 6256 1972 814 726 539 254 195 412 115 188 101 102 58 123 66 108 36 86 51 29 58 43 50 50 43 36 
30% 70% 7019 2186 910 811 609 288 222 468 131 213 115 115 66 139 74 123 41 98 57 33 66 49 57 57 49 41 
20% 80% 7803 2419 1010 900 679 321 247 522 147 238 128 128 73 156 83 137 46 110 64 37 73 55 64 64 55 46 
10% 90% 8571 2653 1109 988 746 353 272 575 161 262 141 141 81 171 91 151 50 121 71 40 81 60 71 71 60 50 
0% 100% 9308 2880 1205 1073 810 383 296 624 175 285 153 153 88 186 99 164 55 131 77 44 88 66 77 77 66 55 
Required EP renewal fee multiplier in order to secure break-even 
SH EP SH UP EPO DE FR GB NL SE BE AT PL DK IE FI CZ PT HU GR LU RO SK SI BG CY EE LT LV MT 
100% 0%
90% 10% 1.14 1.29 1.20 1.21 
80% 20% 1.34 1.80 1.53 1.56 
70% 30% 1.55 2.72 2.03 2.10 
60% 40% 1.36 4.12 2.50 2.66 
50% 50% 6.87 2.80 3.19 
40% 60% 11.49 1.01 2.01 
30% 70% 21.39 
20% 80% 37.30 
10% 90% 46.36 
0% 100%                                                     
Required multiplier for total EPO granted patents in order to secure break-even 
SH EP SH UP EPO DE FR GB NL SE BE AT PL DK IE FI CZ PT HU GR LU RO SK SI BG CY EE LT LV MT 
100% 0%
90% 10% 1.04 1.14 1.07 1.07 
80% 20% 1.06 1.25 1.12 1.13 
70% 30% 1.06 1.31 1.13 1.15 
60% 40% 1.02 1.32 1.11 1.12 
50% 50% 1.30 1.06 1.08 
40% 60% 1.25 1.00 1.02 
30% 70% 1.19 
20% 80% 1.11 
10% 90% 1.04 
0% 100%                                                     
Note: The bold and italic cells correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation. The blank cells correspond to cases which are better off than the current situation. 
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